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Abstract: The way citizens regard and treat one another in everyday life, even when they 
are not engaged in straightforwardly “political” activities, matters for achieving 
democratic ideals. This claim provokes an underexamined unease in many. Here I 
articulate these concerns, which I argue are prompted by the approaches most often 
associated with these issues. Such theories, like democratic communitarianism, require 
problematic sorts of unity in everyday social life. To avoid these difficulties, I offer an 
alternative, called procedural democratic informal politics, which allows democrats to 
evaluate everyday life without demanding questionable forms of unity within it. 
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The way citizens regard and treat one another in everyday life, even when they are not 
engaged in straightforwardly “political” activities, matters for achieving democratic 
ideals. Whether a society holds prejudices against broad segments of the population—
viewing them as likely criminals—affects who participates in democratic governance and 
on what terms.1 Whether citizens expect their political conversations to be grounded in 
truth determines if democratic deliberation is possible.2 And whether child-rearing 
practices are structured one way or another affects which political values children end up 
committed to.3 Such elements of everyday life are deeply shaped by formal legal 
                                                
1 Lerman and Weaver, Arresting Citizenship, 125–37; Gottschalk, Caught, 247–48. 
2 Stanley, How Propaganda Works, 90–91. 
3 Miklikowska and Hurme, “Democracy Begins at Home.” See also Rosenblum, “Democratic 
Families,” which makes clear that although realizing democracy depends upon informal life, 
informal life should not be expected to resemble the formal institutions of democracy. The 
informal sphere must be set up to support democracy’s realization, but that does not necessarily 
demand things like democratic decision-making in families, religious institutions, or other non-
state institutions.  
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institutions, but are not fully determined by them. Yet despite arising in part from the 
spontaneous order of everyday interactions, the realization of democracy relies upon 
these subtle elements of social life. Thus, normative democratic theory ought to pay 
attention to this realm. 
Pointing this out provokes an underexamined unease in many. In what follows, I 
articulate these concerns and put forward an approach—procedural democratic informal 
politics—that can avoid them. In the process, I introduce several significant distinctions 
into democratic theory. 
I defend a democratic concern for everyday life against those who think that when 
normatively evaluating social interactions that occur outside of political institutions, we 
should not take democracy into account. For some critics, the goal of shaping informal 
interactions to support democracy is inherently illegitimate. Others question the means 
required to pursue democratic values within civil society. Against them, I advocate the 
need to think about how to make patterns of informal interaction compatible with 
democratic government. To do so, I articulate a way to understand everyday life as 
important for democracy without making implausible demands of it. 
This project comes in the wake of Susan Moller Okin and G. A. Cohen’s 
challenges to Rawlsian theories of justice to consider everyday life, Philip Pettit’s 
discussions of cultures of contestation, and Axel Honneth’s recent studies of ethical life.4 
I argue that democracy makes normative demands of the informal sphere—the realm of 
custom, collective presuppositions, and other decentralized social forces affecting action 
and understanding. My discussion focuses on a broad conceptual point: given the nature 
                                                
4 Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family; Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality; Pettit, On the 
People’s Terms; Honneth, Freedom’s Right. Allen’s Talking to Strangers also emphasizes the 
importance of informal interactions for pursuing racial justice. 
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of democratic ideals, formal institutions alone cannot realize democracy. We need an 
adequate version of what I will call democratic informal politics, which requires 
expanding the scope of democratic concern to civil society interactions. 
Although democratic communitarians are often associated with such informal 
political matters, their approach threatens to generate a worrisome dilemma. The means 
they recommend to achieve democratically required informal conditions—like 
Rousseau’s proposed state supervision of culture—face insuperable objections. We 
cannot sidestep these issues by focusing only on formal institutions, though; democracy 
requires particular patterns of action, belief, and commitment in the informal sphere. 
Democrats must reckon with the informal sphere’s dispersed and decentralized normative 
structures without compromising important values. If we pursue democratic 
communitarian informal politics, we seem to meet the first horn of our dilemma: 
objections to the means necessary to achieving this goal. If we give up this goal, we meet 
the second horn: the failure to achieve democratic ideals. 
My alternative procedural approach avoids this dilemma. Unlike democratic 
communitarianism, my conception of democratic informal politics considers democracy 
achievable not just in unified cultures, but also fragmentary ones. This procedural 
conception is satisfied if the informal sphere’s elements do not conflict with the 
democratic process, whether those elements cohere into a unified whole or not. It finds a 
happy medium between ignoring everyday life and placing problematic demands on it.  
I. Democratic Informal Politics 
A. Introducing the Informalist Thesis 
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My aim in this section is to explain and defend the thought that democracy depends on 
some particular type (or types) of democratic informal politics. I call this claim the 
informalist thesis. The nature of this dependence may vary, but any plausible conception 
of democracy causally depends on what the informal sphere is like. I will focus on such 
causal dependence in my argument: the informal sphere must operate so as to provide an 
essential causal basis for formal institutions to function democratically.5 I do not defend 
this thesis with respect to a particular conception of democracy, but regarding the general 
concept of democracy. 
To explicate what I mean by the general concept of democracy, I make use of the 
distinction between concepts and conceptions. As Christine Korsgaard explains, “the 
concept names the problem, the conception proposes a solution.”6 The concept of 
democracy, as I understand it, names the problem of trying to make political decisions in 
ways that respect the freedom and equality of adults subject to those decisions.7 Different 
normative democratic theories attempt to articulate what such free and equal standing 
means. My stipulative definition of democracy spells out what kind of issues and 
                                                
5 Democracy can depend upon formal politics in a causal or constitutive sense. More demanding 
conceptions of democracy will require informal politics to embody certain democratic elements 
as a constituent part of achieving democracy. Other views will acknowledge that the achievement 
of certain sorts of democratic informal politics are causally necessary for achieving democracy, 
even if it is not inherently part of that view’s democratic ideals. For democratic theories that treat 
informal politics as a constitutive element of their ideals (i.e. claiming that democracy is itself 
realized in everyday life, to some extent), the informalist thesis will be trivially true. As a result, I 
focus on the causal claim here. 
Focusing on the claim that democracy causally depends on democratic informal politics does not 
necessitate denying that formal institutions are central to democratic ideals. Nor does it rule out 
reciprocal causal dependence of informal politics on formal institutions. On the contrary, such 
reciprocal causation between the formal and informal is clearly significant for the realization of 
democracy. Institutional contexts can establish the conditions for the development of democratic 
informal politics, which in turn can support and maintain the democratic qualities of those formal 
institutions.  
6 Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity, 114. 
7 I do not mean to suggest that these are the only possible values a political system can or should 
aim at. These are simply the democratically relevant ones. 
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problems democracy is meant to address while particular conceptions (political liberal, 
pluralist, minimalist, etc.) take varying approaches to these problems and issues. As I 
proceed, I use the concepts of political freedom and equality as placeholders for the 
various detailed proposals that spell out general interpretations of democracy. My 
argument applies to all such conceptions. 
Although the numerous conceptions of democracy interpret the concept of free 
and equal standing differently, I argue they all require certain sorts of informal politics. I 
do not assume minimalist, pluralist, or deliberative, premises, then—any of these genuine 
sorts of normative democratic theory (and others) remain on the table. Instead, I assume 
that democracy of some sort is justified and then argue that the informal sphere must 
meet some sort of democratic requirements. I will not determine what specific sort of 
requirements democratic informal politics should involve; those specifics must be filled 
in by one’s chosen conception of democracy, which, I have explained, is left open here. 
Moreover, my arguments are only meant to address those committed to 
maintaining a democratic standpoint. Some may reject democracy or simply be 
comfortable sacrificing normative democratic legitimacy in favor of other ideals, such as 
economic efficiency, individual negative liberty, or overall social well-being. In this 
paper, I do not have the space to mount a defense of the priority of democratic 
legitimacy, so I leave that task to others.8  
In any democracy, individuals must have the status of a free and equal member 
with respect to political decision-making; that commitment is internal to the concept. 
                                                
8 For one argument for prioritizing legitimacy over other values, see Pettit, On the People’s 
Terms. 
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Noting the relational character of this status is the first step toward vindicating the 
informalist thesis. This status entails that others must recognize and respect certain claims 
a citizen might make. Theorists generally agree that political freedom and equality 
involve things like a citizen’s right to vote, to exercise freedom of speech, and to have 
significant access to the political process. Most also require the rule of law, where laws 
apply to all citizens equally. These requirements set out the baseline threshold for what it 
means to protect citizens’ free and equal status.9 
My discussion of the informalist thesis relies on the notion of what G. A. Cohen 
calls a site: a location, a set of institutions or practices, a being, or an object that one can 
apply certain standards or norms to.10 Applying these standards or norms means 
interpreting something as having a certain normative structure; it shows up as the sort of 
thing that can be right or wrong, better or worse. Here I focus on two broad sites, which I 
will call the formal sphere and the informal sphere. 
The formal sphere is the normative order promulgated by the somewhat 
centralized authority or authorities in a polity—usually the state. This positive, effective 
authority originates in a particular set of institutions and its claims on people have a 
general form (applying to broad categories of things). Such institutions claim to give 
                                                
9 In suggesting that democracy requires certain baseline conditions, I do not mean to deny that a 
society can be more or less democratic. Nonetheless, we can also identify when there is an 
adequate level of democracy relative to particular benchmarks. For instance, a democracy may be 
adequate insofar as its legal system treats citizens in a normatively legitimate way or insofar as it 
should be understood to speak on behalf of its people in the international arena. Democracies may 
go beyond such levels of sufficiency, however, in perfectly and completely achieving free and 
equal status for all. Viewing democratic ideals in either on-off adequacy terms or less-more scalar 
terms can be useful, depending on what philosophers aim to understand about a democracy. In 
this paper, I will focus upon adequacy relative to a system’s normative democratic legitimacy. 
Although evaluating whether we have more or less democracy can be useful for various purposes, 
identifying sufficiency conditions for legitimate democratic decision-making is crucial, as well, 
and is central to democratic theory.  
10 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality. See also Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. 
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people reason to conform to patterns that are made more or less explicit in legal rules, 
standards, and principles. An explicit, socially effective rule is not automatically within 
the formal sphere; the appropriate political authorities must also recognize it.11 
The informal sphere involves normative structures with a general form, which 
make claims on some category of thing. In this respect, they are unlike personal, 
particularized normative structures between friends—an act or belief that Rolf expects of 
Stefan, say.12 Crucially, the authority governing informal normative structures is 
anonymous: a sizeable portion of civil society treats an action or belief as subject to 
certain criteria. Individuals aren’t understood to respect informal normative structures 
due to a state institution or an individual’s demands. Instead, normative structures hold 
sway if substantial portions of society are best interpreted as seeing them as authoritative. 
The category of informal structures includes collective background beliefs and attitudes, 
presuppositions, self-understandings, customs, conventions, social expectations, shared 
practices, and collective ideals.13   
                                                
11 Rules of etiquette, for instance, might be articulated with tedious explicitness by Miss Manners, 
but are nonetheless not part of the formal sphere. The authority these rules claim does not find its 
source in any centralized institution. Suppose a group of people got together and formed The 
Etiquette Committee. They promulgate new regulations of etiquette in a particular society. They 
make claims of a general form from within their particular institution, i.e. the Committee. That, 
one might think, seems like enough to push such a committee into the formal sphere. The 
committee does not yet count as part of the formal sphere, however, insofar as the Committee’s 
authority doesn’t hold sway in the society overall. They can make claims, but they have no force; 
no pattern of conduct or belief corresponds to what the Committee is putting forward. If people 
started to follow its dictates—whether out of being persuaded or coerced—then the Committee 
would rightly be considered part of the formal institutional structure. It might rival or 
complement the state’s authority, but insofar as it regulated a community it would be part of the 
formal sphere and its promulgated rules would count as products of that sphere. 
12 Perhaps Rolf and Stefan have the shared expectation that Rolf will chop the vegetables and 
Stefan will cook them when they dine together. For my purposes, I leave such cases aside; they 
do not generally have democratic importance (with possible, rare exceptions). 
13 There is a deeply contested issue that relates to where to place the market in the account I am 
offering. Neoliberals see the market as something that springs up spontaneously without the aid 
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We frequently judge whether informal normative structures hold sway in a 
society. For instance: “In Germany, one makes eye contact while making a toast.” This 
judgment does not require that this custom always be followed or that agents “have it in 
mind” while acting. Visitors to Germany often fail to observe the practice initially and 
natives may conform almost automatically. An observer, however, could attest that the 
custom has authority in Germany. Informal normative structures are sometimes much less 
explicit, but can nonetheless effectively structure action or belief in social orders, as with 
implicit bias. Like the formal sphere, the informal sphere is a dynamic system. It includes 
stable components, those that emerge or fade away, and actors working to conserve or 
transform the system.14 
Both the formal and informal spheres feature certain patterns and structures. Some 
matter for democracy, while others do not.15 I call normative structures that matter 
politically formal or informal politics.16 Formal politics involves legislative procedures, 
voting, and the like. Informal politics is less widely discussed.17 Whereas formal politics 
                                                                                                                                            
of state institutions; it is arrived at as the most efficient way to conduct economic transactions. 
Their critics, like Karl Polanyi and many others, understand markets to be something made 
possible by state intervention into social life. See Polanyi, The Great Transformation. Which side 
is correct will determine whether spheres of market exchange should be understood as mainly in 
the formal or informal sphere. The former see market exchange as a more informal sort of 
normative structure, while the latter see it as part of the formal sphere in modern capitalist 
societies. Some intermediate answer may also be possible, as well, but I do not attempt to resolve 
these issues here. 
14 There also may be various sub-informal spheres, such as the counter-publics Michael Dawson 
and Nancy Fraser discuss. See Dawson, Black Visions; Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere.” 
15 For instance, whether a political community has collective ideals about space travel or having a 
national park system need not affect citizens’ freedom and equality. The hegemony of 
homophobic norms, however, matters politically. 
16 To be clear, the content of the informal structures may not be explicitly political (i.e. regulating 
something with reference to freedom or equality), while still having political significance. 
17 Joshua Cohen says it concerns “the public culture […] where the stakes include discursive 
presuppositions, as well as social conventions and norms backed by decentralized sanctions.” 
Cohen, “Privacy, Pluralism, and Democracy,” 318. Cohen does not self-consciously attempt to 
define informal politics in this quote, but he refers to T.M. Scanlon’s work in a way that makes 
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is tied to the state, informal politics closely relates to civil society, the informal sphere 
that I have been introducing. The core of my focus will be how this informal domain 
plays into democratic theory. In focusing on informal politics, I do not deny that 
democratic formal politics will be the central mechanism for adjudicating social 
disagreements, only that this adjudication partially relies on informal processes, as well. 
Within the context of decision-making processes, rights enforcement mechanisms, and 
other institutional structures, members of society must act in ways that allow decisions to 
be reached in ways that respect citizens’ political freedom and equality. Formal 
institutions must leave space for—and enable—citizens to develop civil society’s norms 
and understandings in ways that will allow democracy to be maintained. 
B. Justifying the Informalist Thesis 
To defend the informalist thesis, I will show that if we want to realize democracy, 
components of the informal sphere must be structured to be responsive to the values of 
universal political freedom and equality. That is, democracy demands democratic 
informal politics. I cannot detail the ways relevant parts of the informal sphere might 
respect democratic values here.18 I simply suggest that democratic values, on whatever 
interpretation turns out to be correct, require such responsiveness. To be clear, 
informalists do not require each citizen to adopt some set of democratic commitments. 
Rather, they care when normative structures in tension with democracy gain effective 
sway in a significant part of the informal sphere. 
                                                                                                                                            
clear he is referring to this phrase, which Scanlon coins in that essay. He refers specifically to 
Scanlon, “The Difficulty of Tolerance.” 
18 Broadly, informal normative structures might causally produce or intrinsically constitute 
democracy’s realization. 
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To motivate the informalist thesis, I evaluate the opposing view, ultimately 
shifting the burden onto it. One might claim the formal sphere is all that is necessary for 
realizing democracy; only this sphere’s authoritative normative structures are needed to 
realize universal freedom and equality in a society’s political system. Constituting the 
state’s institutions in the right way results in democracy, the thought goes. Call this claim 
the formalist thesis. It suggests that democracy will be achieved if citizens are accorded 
a free and equal status when engaging with the centralized formal institutions of 
democracy; the scope of democracy’s demands extends no further than these structures. 
People hold this thesis for various reasons. Some think that, if there are any 
permissible ways to improve the informal sphere, we should. They worry, though, that 
this otherwise decent goal, in fact, requires illicit means. The next section of this paper 
lays out the objections such a holder of the formalist thesis might make and offers replies. 
Others hold the formalist thesis due to a principled concern for preserving 
individuals’ spheres of negative freedom; they reject informalist aims. “Private” norms 
need not involve equal respect or other democratic values, they argue. For them, 
democracy is consistent with individuals restricting their property discriminatorily (in 
restrictive covenants or the refusal to rent or sell to certain groups). Such formalists 
accept that individual exercises of negative liberty may give significant sway to 
questionable informal normative structures. Their commitment to negative freedom 
means that they do not aim at any particular sort of informal politics, since they shun 
attempts to restructure civil society as illegitimate. 
When rejecting informalist aims, formalists can either try to maintain their 
commitment to democracy or give it up. In what follows, I argue that those who reject 
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informalist aims can only take the second option and jettison their democratic 
commitments. Neglecting the informal sphere means ignoring crucial factors that affect 
whether society meets the threshold for democratic legitimacy. Potential counter-
democratic currents in everyday life can undermine citizens’ free and equal status relative 
to the political decision-making process.  
While few formalists remain committed to democratic ideals, I initially focus on 
this position, demonstrating its implausibility in order to bolster the informalist thesis. 
When formalists deem informalist aims impermissible, they allow the hegemony of 
informal norms that undermine some citizens’ equal political status.19 As a result, they 
cannot remain democrats, unless they give up such formalist stances in favor of 
informalism. 
Rejecting informalist aims starts to look antidemocratic once one considers how 
individuals’ informal statuses can affect their formal political status.20 The effective 
exercise of democratic rights and freedoms depends on the informal sphere’s constitution. 
Informal statuses at least partially determine if people are recognized and respected in the 
                                                
19 Pincione and Tesòn’s Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation is an especially radical 
example of the libertarian adherence to negative freedom as the ultimate value. They attack 
majoritarian political procedures, favoring minimalist government where people choose to enter 
small homogenous communities, which may not be liberal and democratic. What they see as very 
basic rights (contract and right of exit) are enforced by an overarching court system, but they 
eschew coercive structures beyond that. Animated by a concern for negative freedom, they only 
leave room for political equality as an instrument of political freedom (i.e. as something 
discretionary, rather than something political frameworks are obligated to protect). If a view like 
theirs were committed to formal equality as a necessary instrument for freedom, my arguments 
provide reasons for thinking that, to provide political equality’s fair value, democratic informal 
politics is also necessary. Pincione and Tesòn make clear that they are happy to dispense with 
even formal political equality and are, as a result, outside the scope of my discussion here. A view 
much like theirs might view formal political equality as instrumental, but indispensible: for 
anyone to enjoy negative freedom they would need a community where they had formal political 
equality. Such a formalist view is subject to the arguments I lay out here. 
20 The following argument has some parallels with Rawls’ recognition that citizens must be 
accorded the fair value of their rights. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, section 36. 
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formal sphere as co-equals. Class, gender, race, social role, appearance, manner of dress, 
and a manifold of other things prompt various response patterns, varying across 
situational context, but maintaining certain core, if plastic, meanings. These 
constellations have differing degrees of stability and are shapeable by human agency to 
varying degrees. It’s a manifest fact that these social markers matter for everyday life. 
Recall that the formalist thesis suggests democracy only makes demands of the 
formal sphere’s normative structures and that the informal sphere need not and ought not 
be pushed to be responsive to democratic values. It claims realizing democratic norms in 
the informal sphere entails problematic limits on liberty; patterns in this sphere may be 
constituted any which way, as a result. No normative constraints on informal life are 
democratically necessary, on this view; actors in civil society can exercise their rights 
however they’d like without undermining democracy. This formalist position doesn’t 
deny that formal institutions must legally regulate individuals in order to protect 
individuals’ rights and establish democratic decision-making procedures. The view does, 
however, object to the further informalist claim that civil society ought to shape itself to 
be compatible with democracy. Actors in civil society such as individuals, social groups, 
non-governmental organizations, and political movements need not work to maintain an 
overall ethos compatible with democracy. Formalists are wary of expecting informal 
democratic action, such as practicing and promoting social norms that are not rigidly 
hierarchical or building civic competences through democratic pedagogical approaches.21 
                                                
21 In saying that civil society actors can constrain themselves and shape informal social life for 
the sake of cultivating a democratic informal sphere, I do not deny that formal institutions play a 
crucial role in enabling the maintenance of democratic informal politics. Formal institutions 
support democratic informal politics (by protecting rights, providing resources, and so on), which 
can, in turn, reciprocally support the functioning of those same democratic institutions. 
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To see the strangeness of the formalist thesis, one only need consider its concrete 
implications. When a group is arbitrarily treated unequally in economic life, in social 
situations, and in personal relationships, their freedom to pursue certain paths in life is, 
resultantly, restricted. Yet formalism suggests they can still realize their political freedom 
and equality in the formal sphere, acting (and being treated as) full participants in 
democracy. Informal normative structures would not causally undermine citizens’ 
freedom and equality in the formal sphere—to enjoy free speech rights, run for office, 
and so on. Reverberations of status markers in the informal sphere are somehow kept out 
of the formal one, according to this view. Supposedly, from a democratic perspective, 
there is a strict causal separation between these two realms. 
This strict compartmentalization of the informal and formal spheres strains 
credulity. For one, people have long pointed out that patterns of privilege (like 
educational attainment and economic power) can exclude people from enjoying the fair 
value of their formal rights.22 Given how much bias is implicit and unconscious, it would 
be remarkable if conscious democratic commitment alone could easily overcome it.23 
Even if biases in the informal sphere were consciously held, why and how would formal 
norms be constituted democratically? Something must explain how people seen as 
unworthy of basic social respect and esteem could simultaneously enjoy political freedom 
and equality, to take an extreme, but sadly realistic example. Without that story, it’s hard 
to accept the formalist thesis.24 These points suggest that democratic theory requires 
                                                
22 See Sanders, “Against Deliberation”; Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference; Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy. 
23 For discussion of implicit bias, see Fricker, Epistemic Injustice. 
24 I’m not making a claim about conceptual possibility here, but about something like empirical 
probability. In a discussion of more specific theories of democracy (rather than its general 
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some sort of democratic informal politics as an enabling precondition for achieving 
democratic ideals to an extent adequate for normatively legitimacy. Defending the 
opposing formalist thesis will depend to some degree on empirical evidence.25 Even 
without having all such evidence on the table, the formalist thesis must assume the 
burden of proof. Its empirical claims are hard to take seriously.26 
Without definitively refuting the formalist thesis, I have suggested that it lacks 
initial plausibility and attractiveness. Democratic theorists should affirm the informalist 
thesis, absent very powerful empirical evidence and/or normative arguments against it. 
II. Objections to Democratic Informal Politics 
Democratic communitarians exemplify supporters of the informalist thesis, arguing for a 
unified informal sphere that involves strong commitment to democracy. These views, 
which require the informal sphere to embody a shared cultural orientation, engender 
concern about what I am calling of the dilemma of democratic informal politics.27 The 
                                                                                                                                            
conception), more concrete, tight connections between the informal and formal sphere should be 
possible to make. 
25 To take just one example of the empirical counterevidence, educational levels, which are tied 
closely to social status, are highly correlated with individual levels of political participation. See 
Berinsky and Lenz, “Education and Political Participation.” 
26 Beyond these points about presupposing democratic informal politics as causally necessary, the 
formalist thesis is too hasty in dismissing informal politics as inherently valuable to democracy. 
Some democratic theories, such as many versions of deliberative democracy, suggest the informal 
status of citizens is part of democracy’s aim. These views see eliminating socio-cultural 
marginalization and disintegration as aims intrinsic to democracy. Democracy, they believe, 
means making sure that things like gender, class, and race do not undermine individuals’ equal 
social status. Because the concept of democracy is at issue, those that deny the informalist thesis 
must undermine conceptions of democracy that incorporate informalism. That places a burden of 
proof onto the proponent of the formalist thesis to argue against substantive conceptions of 
democracy, like certain sorts of deliberativism. 
27 While this democratic communitarian position is obviously supportive of the informalist thesis, 
informalism need not entail such a maximalist democratic theory. The informalist thesis is 
compatible with a variety of theories of democracy, both austere and demanding ones. Consider 
minimalism, which likens democracy to a market where self-interested, dull-witted citizens 
choose political products (candidates). A minimalist like Richard Posner’s view depends on 
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means to pursue communitarian reforms of informal life raise serious objections. These 
objections, which I spell out in what follows, threaten to drive us away from democratic 
informal politics and, given what I have argued, away from realizing democracy. 
A. The Demands of Democratic Informal Politics 
We can begin by surveying some demands these theorists impose on the informal sphere. 
Rousseau, when considering the informal sphere, calls for a “legislator” to hand down a 
religiously infused culture to undergird citizens’ adherence to democratic law.28 He 
insists on state supervision of culture to maintain civic virtue, such as trying to keep the 
theater out of Geneva, his adopted home.29 In addition to suggesting that the state’s 
geographical size be kept small, he thinks its way of life must be unified, solidary, and 
patriotic.  
Benjamin Barber, who criticizes Rousseau despite being influenced by him, is 
also attracted to strong informal unity. Citizens, Barber says, ought to be “neighbors” 
who share a “common consciousness”—not strangers. Moreover, he laments that “dissent 
is a signal that community itself may be in jeopardy, while the presence of majorities and 
                                                                                                                                            
accepting the informalist thesis, insofar as informal life is instrumentally important to the 
functioning of formal institutions. The people, he says, despite their political ignorance, are a 
“repository of common sense,” preventing experts from implementing pie-in-the-sky proposals. 
See Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 168. Posner even suggests that a non-self-
interested, engaged populace is disastrous for democracy. See his Law, Pragmatism, and 
Democracy, 192–93. He thinks that given certain purported facts about human nature, 
democracy’s political culture must be apathetic. Posner’s implicit acceptance of the informalist 
thesis puts him in the company of those he is otherwise deeply opposed to in democratic theory 
like the democratic communitarians. Rousseau and Richard Posner make for strange bedfellows, 
but the informalist thesis, while compatible with and implicitly accepted by many views, is far 
from trivial. Accepting it forces theorists to confront the problem of democracy’s scope without 
restricting their focus to formal political institutions. Even a minimalist who implicitly accepts the 
informalist thesis like Posner will need to answer the worries about democratic informal politics 
posed in this section. 
28 Rousseau, The Social Contract, 84-88. 
29 Rousseau, Politics and the Arts. 
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minorities is a symbol of the disintegration of community altogether.”30 While Barber 
accepts some conflict and disagreement, these statements raise worries about demanding 
too much social unity. 
David Miller also has a strongly unitary view of democracy. He thinks it depends 
upon a national community with a shared “public culture,” meaning “a set of 
understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together.”31 This shared 
understanding includes political principles, social norms, and cultural ideals related to 
language and, most controversially, religion. Miller’s public culture is not something 
monolithic that blocks out minority cultures or homogenizes a society, though; it can 
grow and change. Miller thinks the development of public cultures will be very nation-
specific. While understandable, this approach leaves things vague. It raises concerns 
about whether his approach will be overly relativistic.32 His proposals for nationalistic 
civic education and other “nation-building” endeavors are also hard to evaluate without a 
concrete sense about how they would be pursued.33 
 Democratic communitarians believe democracy requires at least some substantive 
unity in the informal sphere; all citizens must have allegiance to the culture’s democratic 
form of life. Everyday life should instrumentally support democracy, or even intrinsically 
realize democratic values. Such unity is particular to a society; it offers a value 
orientation around which the community can cohere and identify. Communitarians are so 
demanding because they believe democracy requires serious economic redistribution, 
                                                
30 Barber, Strong Democracy, 310. 
31 Miller, On Nationality, 26. 
32 His claim that “societies acquire the forms of government that suit them best,” while meant to 
be anti-imperialist, has problematic relativist resonance, for example. Miller, On Nationality, 177. 
For a similar argument with such implications, see Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States.”  
33 Miller, On Nationality, 178. 
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which resultantly requires great commitment. Ties of mutual affection that only members 
of a common culture can develop enable such sacrifices, they believe.  
Communitarian theorists’ suggestions for developing and maintaining informal 
unity are worrisome, though. Rousseau suggests censors are an important way to express 
the community’s judgment of components of cultural life. In Barber, we find unrealistic 
goals for citizen participation and unanimity in decision-making, eliciting worries about 
paralysis and de-facto conservatism. His insistence on “common consciousness” and 
strong communal solidarity also threatens to improperly exclude social “outsiders” and 
crowd out cosmopolitan views.34 Miller’s nationalism, while expressed as inclusive, is 
vague enough to prompt similar worries about marginalization. If pursuing democratic 
informal politics engenders such problems, one might wish to return to formalism, even if 
doing so means falling short of democratically legitimate political decision-making.35 
B. Problems with Democratic Communitarian Demands on the Informal Sphere 
Worries about such views are not over unified communities themselves—if such things 
luckily emerge and flourish, few would object. Rather, the means democratic 
                                                
34 Barber thinks that participation, as well as other reforms, will move us toward democratic 
community, but it’s hard to see how his proposed solutions fit the problem as he describes it. 
35 See, for example, Barry, Culture and Equality. Barry attacks multicultural theories of the 
informal sphere. Such multiculturalist views oppose Rousseau, Barber, and Miller’s hope for 
unified communities. Nonetheless, multiculturalism’s use of the state to recognize and promote 
multiple communities’ values prompts objections similar to those made against communitarians 
(who hope to form and promote the entire society’s shared values). The worry about democratic 
communitarians is that they will oppress or exclude minority positions. The worry about 
multiculturalists is that attempts to recognize and value minority viewpoints will oppress 
individuals who wish to dissent from such minority views (whether from inside or outside of 
those minority groups). Barry worries such dissent and critique is incompatible with 
multiculturalism, which wants broad affirmation and recognition of a plurality of cultures. To be 
clear, these objections to both multiculturalism and communitarianism are not against substantive 
values in public discourse, but to substantive values being given a privileged place simply 
because particular communities adhere to them. I do not take a position on multiculturalist views 
of democracy here; my only point is that these views elicit the worries about democratic informal 
politics that I address in this section. 
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communitarians depend upon to engender unity are the main trouble.36 Objections to 
substantive, communitarian democratic informal politics can take two paths: practical and 
moral. Practically, unified informal politics seem unlikely to emerge in modern contexts. 
Morally, imposing stable democratic informal politics through state coercion seems likely 
to be ethically problematic and possibly exclusionary.  
These issues place democrats in a dilemmatic bind. Democratic ideals demand 
certain forms of informal politics. But achieving and sustaining democratic 
communitarian informal politics appears immoral or even impossible. It seems democrats 
must either be unrealistic and oppressive or fail to realize democracy. After laying out 
these concerns, I will sketch an alternative approach to democratic informal politics, 
which avoids democratic communitarianism’s problems. 
The practical worries are very serious. Many philosophers and social theorists 
observe that modern informal spheres lack unity, coherence, or stable content.37 Without 
overthrowing the modern order for the sake of secure communitarian utopia, the informal 
sphere’s instability appears a real obstacle. If one takes a communitarian approach, then 
liberal rights, creative economic destruction, technological change, and other components 
                                                
36 There may be even more fundamental objections to communitarianism: perhaps implementing 
the view inherently positions minority groups as less politically free and equal than those within 
majority communities, as an anonymous reviewer has suggested to me. There are likely other 
objections to the view, as well. For the purposes of my argument, I focus on objections to the 
means for developing the kind of informal sphere that democratic communitarianism 
recommends, since these objections are sufficient for generating the dilemma to which I respond. 
I focus on the objections that I do, because I view them as the source of many people’s concerns 
about democratic informal politics. 
37 Consider John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas’s views. In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that 
reason operating under free institutions will not alight on any shared conception of the good. He 
seeks something much more minimal than communitarian unity. Habermas, discussing how the 
informal sphere resists organization, calls it “wild” and “anarchic.” Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms, 307–8. To be clear, he ultimately thinks that things can be done (such as encouraging 
independent media) to shape the public sphere in ways that will be friendly to democracy, but he 
is also very skeptical of democratic communitarianism. 
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of modern life seem destined to undermine a democratic informal sphere. Even if these 
hurdles demonstrate that modern social systems should be jettisoned or reformed, it’s 
implausible that we can eliminate all such disruptive forces for the sake of democratic 
communitarianism.  
 Further, the means to produce and support this informal political project may be 
lacking. People’s beliefs and attitudes, their conscious and unconscious behaviors and 
tendencies, and other mysterious parts of practical life largely determine the informal 
sphere’s character. The informal sphere seems not just unstable, but out of our control. 
Even if we somehow stabilized it, we’d be unlikely to achieve the unity communitarians 
require. Nor can we depend on Rousseau’s legislator to appear and do it for us. 
Even if these practical concerns can be overcome, moral difficulties remain. The 
use of legal coercion to impose such informal politics, even for democracy’s sake, may 
prove oppressive or exclusionary.  
It is hard to see how communitarians can avoid problematic legal coercion or 
running afoul of individual rights. Modest proposals for more political participation and 
national-identity fostering curricula appear inadequate for achieving the view’s goals. 
David Miller, for instance, speaks admiringly of late 19th century French modernization 
policies that fostered nationalism through compulsory education and military service.38 If 
that is what France needed, it is hard to see how less invasive policies will succeed today. 
This approach threatens to undermine basic rights and liberties.39 The view faces a head-
                                                
38 Miller, On Nationality, 143. Miller calls the policies “over-strenuous,” but their logic sound. 
39 One might worry that my claim about democratic informal politics proves too much. If 
informal politics can’t be legitimately maintained, what about the formal political patterns 
necessary for democracy? My worry involves the difficulty of maintaining unified informal 
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on collision with freedom of expression, religion, association, conscience, and other 
significant values.40 
There are also moral concerns about democratic informal politics becoming 
exclusionary. The majority culture might dominate a unified informal sphere, or 
otherwise exclude reasonable citizens. Such hegemonic cultural patterns seem to be what 
democratic communitarians must rely on in the informal sphere. A society might try to 
legally preserve these patterns through education or regulation of cultural production, 
hoping to steer informal politics toward what the majority culture prefers. For many 
reasons, most reject excluding social groups through state supported cultural hegemony.41 
If these worries about the legitimacy of fostering democratic informal politics are correct, 
the democratic cure for the informal sphere may be worse than the disease. 
III. Resolving Democracy’s Dilemma through Proceduralism 
Given such arguments, we need a way to pursue democratic informal politics that [1] 
realizes democracy’s values (the Democratic Requirement), [2] can be developed 
through realistic mechanisms (the Practical Possibility Requirement), and [3] is not 
exclusionary or oppressive (the Permissibility Requirement). If a version of democratic 
informal politics meets these requirements, we can avoid our apparent dilemma.  
A. Substantive and Procedural Approaches to Democratic Informal Politics  
                                                                                                                                            
patterns in particular, however. I assume democratic law can be legitimate and that objections to 
communitarian law could not be raised to formal patterns protecting political rights, for example.  
40 Barry expresses this objection in Culture and Equality. By trying to make individuals in society 
into neighbors, these proposals also conflict with what Habermas calls our right to “remain 
strangers.” Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 308. 
41 Political liberals like Rawls will worry about the legitimacy of any law based on such a 
comprehensive doctrine; it will fail to allow for mutual recognition and reciprocity between 
citizens on their view. Others will voice concerns about disintegrating members of minority 
cultures from the political process and undermining their citizenship rights. 
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As we have seen, democratic communitarianism is ill suited to this project. That view 
pursues what I will call substantive democratic informal politics (SDIP). This 
approach demands that individuals in a society recognize the authority of the same 
informal normative structures. It requires them to identify with specific social norms and 
practices, as well as identifying with each other, ultimately forming a culturally 
integrated community. 
For any particular normative structure in the informal sphere, SDIP asks whether 
it fits into society’s shared culture in a way consistent with realizing democracy. Stronger 
versions of SDIP, like Rousseau’s perhaps, demand that each normative structure help to 
produce democracy as understood by the unified community’s culture. Other sorts of 
SDIP restrict their demands to a core set of informal normative structures (Miller’s 
“public culture”). In its stronger and weaker variant, SDIP cannot avoid the dilemma of 
democratic informal politics, as we have seen. 
In lieu of SDIP, the best candidate for meeting the three requirements is what I 
call, following Albrecht Wellmer, procedural democratic informal politics (PDIP). 42 
He explains, “We might, then, elucidate the term ‘procedural’ as follows: it means a way 
of dealing with dissent or conflict, in which orientation by the normative conditions of 
                                                
42 To forestall confusion, I should note that my use of the term procedural is not entirely parallel 
with the usage commonly found in political philosophy. Often, the idea of proceduralism is that a 
properly constituted democratic process is what matters for legitimacy, regardless of the 
outcomes of that process. When I use proceduralism, I mean to suggest that a type of informal 
politics counts as democratic by virtue of being compatible or consistent with a particular 
conception of the democratic process. In this respect, my usage of the term is closer to the 
proceduralism found in Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms, which also sets substantive 
constraints on the informal sphere as a condition of democratic discourse. That means, then, that 
it is not an implication of my view that outcomes of democratic procedures do not matter. My use 
of the term “procedural” contrasts with a substantive approach to informal politics that evaluates 
elements of the informal sphere according to whether they fit into a particular, unified form of 
life. I thank James Bohman for pressing me to clarify this terminology. 
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democratic discourse defines—not the only, but—the only ultimately obliging standard 
of judgment.”43 PDIP identifies constraints on the informal sphere that are necessary to 
realize the democratic process, rather than requiring particular normative structures. To 
judge informal normative structures’ adequacy, we ask if they can coexist with realized 
procedures of democracy in the formal and informal spheres. 
Informal normative structures cannot be inconsistent with political freedom and 
equality on this view: they cannot causally undermine it and cannot inherently constitute 
political inequality or lack of freedom. How those committed to democracy should 
interpret political freedom and inequality in PDIP depends, of course, on what theory of 
democracy is best.44 A number of non-communitarian views of democracy can adopt 
versions of PDIP, though, such as minimalism, pluralism, and deliberativism.  
For PDIP, unlike SDIP, the substantive content of the democratic informal sphere 
is left significantly open; communitarian unity and shared identification with 
particularistic informal normative structures is unnecessary. Instead, the shifting nature 
and contestability of normative structures in the informal sphere is assumed, albeit within 
constraints.45 Different individuals may act in accordance with different possible informal 
normative structures, so long as they are compatible with a democratic political process. 
                                                
43 Wellmer, “Conditions of a Democratic Culture,” 51. 
44 In contrast to my more general approach, Wellmer only relies on Rawls, Habermas, and Walzer 
to spell out what democratic procedures and norms ought to look like. For both of us, though, 
informal social reconciliation is always incomplete; in modern societies, there is always some 
remainder of disunity. 
45 In contrast to the communitarian views I am discussing here, I do not take theories that depend 
on a “shared sense of justice” to be subject to these objections to cultural unity. I have in mind 
Forst’s discussion in The Right to Justification or Rawls’s even less demanding “overlapping 
consensus” in Political Liberalism. Such a “shared sense” is not a communitarian value 
orientation, but a commitment to universalistic rights to justification that distinguish the reasons 
relevant in political justification. These views permit significant disagreement and contestation. 
Views that advert to minimal unity over the form of political justification can avoid the problems 
faced by more expansive, particularistic views. 
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PDIP requires that normative structures in the informal sphere, in conjunction with those 
in the formal sphere, deal with disunity and fragmentation in a way consistent with 
democratic values. That means various forms of life may co-exist and hold varying 
degrees of sway within a society, so long as they can coexist with a realized democratic 
process. When PDIP is realized in a society, there may be differing childrearing practices, 
varying understandings of appropriate speech, or diverse ways that non-state institutions 
like places of worship and social clubs are structured. These norms, practices, and 
understandings can be non-unitary, so long as they can coexist with normatively 
legitimate democratic procedures. 
SDIP judges the democratic qualities of informal normative structures according 
to a thick, particularistic conception of democracy. Its standards are analogous to those 
that are meant for evaluating choreographed dancers. Dancers’ movements, like relevant 
informal normative structures, are supposed to fit together coherently. This approach 
suggests that the informal sphere, like dancers’ movements in a ballet, should exhibit 
unity or elements of design.  
PDIP’s standards are more like those for judging whether participants in a dance 
party are moving in ways appropriate to making the party successful. Dancers must 
respect constraints (i.e. not stepping on others’ feet), but their movements needn’t be in 
unison. People may dance with or without a partner, take breaks, and dance in different 
styles. A great dance party permits deviation and variation. There are some shared 
structures: the sound system and dance space, which roughly correspond to democracy’s 
shared political institutions and processes. Like democracy, we could debate which 
conception of dance parties should guide our understanding of the constraints on 
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participants in this practice. The sense in which conceptions of dance parties are 
analogous to PDIP, is in eschewing demands for unified movement. Informal normative 
structures in PDIP, like dancers’ movements at a party, cannot be any which way, but can 
still take various disjunctive forms. 
B. Strong and Weak Substantive Democratic Informal Politics 
SDIP and PDIP’s demands can be contrasted more concretely. SDIP’s strongest form 
calls for widespread cultural unity for democracy’s sake. The idea is that, by sharing 
many practices and values, people will share a national identity and accept the costs of 
taking part in a democratic process together. For instance, wealth redistribution, for the 
sake of preserving democratic social relationships, will be easier to accept. Without 
shared cultural commitments, the thought goes, people will reject such policies. 
At its wildest extreme, this view demands identification with a set of informal 
normative structures constituting “cultural Britishness” or the ethos of whatever nation is 
at issue. In the British case, David Miller mentions love of the countryside and tea 
drinking (describing a cultural unity he does not endorse as politically requisite).46 The 
view requires the state to establish a particular religion, or even a common atheism. 
Education policy reinforces particular cultural commitments and immigration policy 
judges which entrants could best adopt this common culture. For obvious reasons, many 
find this view unacceptable.47  
SDIP comes in weaker flavors, however. David Miller, for instance, endorses all 
the methods for developing the strongest sort of SDIP, but restricts shared ethos to a core 
                                                
46 Miller, On Nationality, 172. 
47 Such strong SDIP may be defended in Scruton, “In Defence of the Nation.” Rousseau may 
have tendencies in this direction, as well, although this interpretive point is somewhat disputed. 
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“public culture.” He sees established religion as sometimes legitimate, insofar as 
society’s public culture centers on a particular faith. Similarly, institutional policies about 
education and immigration, as well as informal symbols (like shared national flags), can 
be used to encourage collective identity. Miller is careful to note that transformative 
factors like immigration can shape and alter national identity to some extent. His sort of 
democratic informal politics need not be wholly static, so long as it remains unified. 
Weak SDIP is superior to strong variants. It allows cultural pluralism if it fits with 
a core public identity. For instance, weak SDIP permits particular, divergent forms of 
life. What Miller calls “private” cultures may be austere or boisterous, religious or 
secular, trusting of others or skeptical of them. Weak SDIP just demands that adherents to 
varied ways of life share a core set of informal normative structures.48 Miller allows 
variation in how extensively shared informal normative structures must be. He says it 
must be broader than allegiance to common institutions or legal structures like a 
constitution.49 Instead, he suggests shared religion, traditions, common political 
understandings, and social norms can ground a thicker, particular identity.  
While more limited than strong SDIP, Miller still requires conformity to a 
particular identity and set of informal normative structures. One counts as a social equal 
qua participant in British public culture, say. Further, it is unclear from Miller’s account 
how political struggles over SDIP’s content and scope should be adjudicated. There is no 
obvious criterion of correctness for such debates. Miller seems to view it like a 
                                                
48 Staying with the dance analogy, weak SDIP’s requirements are analogous to those of a 
choreographed dance where dancers may occasionally improvise. 
49 Resultantly, Miller rejects Habermas’s constitutional patriotism. 
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competition, where emergent victors count as “authentic.”50 If forming national character 
constitutes such a power struggle, it is doubtful it can be fair, especially given preexisting 
imbalances in any given society. As the last section’s arguments indicated, it is also hard 
to see how SDIP can develop in modern contexts, particularly without morally 
problematic coercion. 
C. The Advantages of Procedural Democratic Informal Politics 
PDIP can avoid these problems. Its concrete demands will, unlike SDIP, not presuppose a 
shared identity or set of informal normative structures. Instead, whatever informal 
normative structures hold sway must be consistent with democratic processes of decision-
making, rather than some particular society-wide informal normative order. One begins 
one’s democratic evaluation of the informal sphere with just a concept of democracy in 
mind, not a concrete, substantial cultural constellation. Some democratic theories, like 
minimalism, emphasize the formal sphere as the democratic process’s location. Others 
include the informal sphere as part of the democratic process. For some deliberative 
democrats, deliberation in the informal public sphere is crucial to decision-making, for 
instance. Different democratic conceptions offer different verdicts about what sort of 
informal politics are needed, but each must make such judgments about it, I have argued. 
In judging education or immigration policy, for instance, PDIP asks if the resultant 
informal normative structures fit with the democratic process prescribed by the chosen 
democratic theory.  
Suppose, arguendo, we take minimalism, a view compatible with PDIP, as the 
correct theory of democracy. Democracy, on this view, protects basic individual rights 
                                                
50 Miller, On Nationality, 40. 
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and allows citizens to choose elites to rule over them. Democratic processes consist in 
citizens choosing who runs the formal institutions of government. Those elected must 
refrain from violating citizens’ rights while governing.  
Richard Posner’s minimalism entails some basic informal political prerequisites. 
For one, citizens must be capable of pursuing their self-interest.51 This capacity lets them 
vote out politicians that support policies that harm them. Otherwise, society’s informal 
political orientation ought to be disengaged, on this view. Informal norms and customs 
must discourage citizens from interfering with elected elites’ decisions.52 Political 
engagement undermines what minimalists see as their view’s appeal: protecting citizens’ 
rights and interests without placing heavy demands on them.  
Minimalism is, of course, highly controversial. Rather than endorsing it, I 
describe it merely to demonstrate how PDIP—with which minimalism fits—can avoid 
SDIP’s problems. Take the following case: imagine that immigration greatly alters which 
particular, substantive informal normative structures hold sway in a society. Minimalist 
PDIP, by contrast to democratic communitarianism’s SDIP, can accept this change.53 
New citizens may introduce artistic traditions, religious practices, or political 
understandings. Suppose that entrants have a hippie ethos, while current citizens are more 
puritan and stern. The informal normative structures the hippies introduce are more 
approving of and conducive to freedom of expression (free love, valorization of nature, 
                                                
51 Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 168. 
52 Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 192–93. 
53 Even a paradigmatic supporter of weak SDIP, David Miller, explicitly defends immigration 
restrictions to bolster a particularistic national culture. Without opposing all cultural change, he 
still aims to minimize it. See Miller, “Immigration: The Case for Limits,” 199–201. 
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etc.). The population they join adheres to informal normative structures that maximize 
deliberative rationality (they promote serious normative discussion, say).  
From minimalism’s perspective, it is indifferent which informal normative 
structures take hold. Society might even become close to evenly divided if some puritans 
adopt hippie norms and understandings. This result is compatible with providing 
appropriate background for choosing elites to rule without violating individual rights.54 If 
people are generally commonsensical and willing to let elected politicians lead, society 
can realize minimalist democratic informal politics. PDIP, then, can provide much more 
free reign to the informal sphere than SDIP. 
While I use Posner’s minimalism as an example—because of its simplicity—
many sorts of PDIP are possible, depending on one’s conception of democracy. Differing 
conceptions set different constraints on informal life, based on their understanding of 
what democratic decision-making process requires. Like minimalist PDIP, though, 
various other versions of PDIP allow play and variation within their constraints. While 
some of these proceduralist views may fail, based upon my arguments so far I contend 
some versions of PDIP have hope of succeeding, in contrast to SDIP. 
D. Avoiding the Dilemma through Procedural Democratic Informal Politics 
PDIP can achieve the three requirements for avoiding the dilemma of democratic 
informal politics. It straightforwardly meets the democratic requirement. It is also 
                                                
54 Minimalism is a restrained view, so it is unsurprising it accepts these informal variations so 
sanguinely. Even a more ambitious view like participatory deliberative democracy seems able to 
accept the various informal shifts in the example, though. It requires that participation doesn’t 
decline so much that deliberation becomes impossible. Also, relations between individuals from 
different groups can’t degenerate into disrespect and misrecognition. Yet nothing about these 
informal variations necessitates such degeneration. Varying informal orders seem capable of 
serving as the background for the process of participatory deliberative democracy. 
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plausible to think it can respect the practical possibility requirement. Given the empirical 
contingency involved, guarantees of success in democratizing the informal sphere will 
not be forthcoming. Crucially, though, PDIP’s realistic possibility is not in serious doubt, 
in contrast to SDIP, which faces much greater barriers. Lastly, given the means available 
for developing PDIP, concerns about oppression and exclusion will be lessened; PDIP 
can meet the permissibility requirement. 
In a way, PDIP’s meeting the democratic requirement is definitional. For informal 
politics to be procedurally democratic is for background social conditions to be 
compatible with a democratic process’s realization. That doesn’t mean citizens constantly 
judge themselves through a democratic lens. We must only respond when informal 
normative structures interfere with realizing the democracy. At that point, democratic 
standards become a concern for informal sphere actors.55  
Moreover, PDIP need not deny, or even lament, modernity’s unstable, shifting 
character.56 That it need not do so allows it to avoid concerns about stability suggested by 
the practical possibility requirement. PDIP does not demand instability’s disappearance, 
only its management in a way friendly to democracy. If, for example, groups are 
informally stigmatized and excluded from political power, PDIP demands reform of the 
informal sphere. Means to combat informal stigma are various. Rather than advocating 
censorship, when popular culture supports stigma, the best response may be protests 
                                                
55 I do not claim that democracy is an ultimate authoritative standard in such matters. Instead, I 
claim that to make an informal sphere democratic, actors would need to treat democracy as 
having such authority. 
56 There might be other reasons to find this instability problematic, orthogonal to one’s 
acceptance of the desirability of democratic informal politics. 
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meant to get the creators of such stigmatizing culture to rethink their practices.57 In other 
cases, where marginalized groups’ voices are ignored in public discourse, structural 
reforms to promote their equal social status, like redistributive taxation, may be crucial.  
Informal normative structures that do not affect equal citizenship are irrelevant; their 
emergence or disappearance is not democracy’s concern. Empirically, that may require 
widespread responsiveness to democratic values or it may be more minimal.58 All I claim 
is that democratic concerns transcend the formal political sphere. The hope is that the 
informal structures that must be responsive to democratic values will not be too 
extensive. PDIP focuses on contending with components of informal life that are 
conditions for democracy, insofar as they matter for democratic procedures. 
These scaled-back aims make the goal of adequate democratic informal politics 
look more feasible than with SDIP. The required influence over the informal sphere will 
be less expansive than democratic communitarianism suggested. While luck will, of 
course, be needed, human beings are not entirely in the dark about how cultural 
reproduction works. J. S. Mill emphasizes the possibility of social learning.59 The shaping 
force of education also provides hope for proponents of democratizing change.60 Many 
                                                
57 One can look at recent backlashes against comedians’ use of rape jokes, which many argue 
trivialize and even reinforce rape culture. In this case, it seems likely that attempts to censor 
comedians would be, at best, counterproductive. Although debates surrounding this issue 
continue, these informal protests have prompted a great deal of helpful soul-searching and 
dialogue in that profession. 
58 The scope of informal politics significantly depends on the conception of democracy at issue. 
59 See John Stuart Mill’s insightful treatment of this issue at the outset of “Considerations on 
Representative Government.” 
60 As Amy Gutmann says, “We have […] considerable evidence that democratic virtue can be 
taught in many ways—by teaching male and female, Protestant and Catholic, black and white 
students together from an early age in the same classrooms; by bringing all educable children up 
to a high minimum standard of learning; by respecting religious and ethnic differences; by 
teaching American history not just as a series of elections, laws, treaties, and battles, but as 
lessons in the practice (sometimes successful, sometimes not) of political virtue, lessons that 
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also view participation in private and semi-private civic associations and relationships as 
a means of shaping the informal sphere for democratic ends.61 Social movements are 
crucial, as well. Through protest, they can highlight informal sphere problems and 
advocate solutions. Social systems like law and non-discriminatory markets also have 
indirect, yet crucial (maybe decisive) roles to play in providing amenable conditions for 
democracy. Social scientific research, pursued with reference to particular conceptions of 
democracy, must fill in the details of any of these mechanisms, of course. Nonetheless, 
they offer numerous means to make the informal sphere more responsive to democratic 
values. 
Even if we can causally accomplish this task, we still might worry about its 
permissibility. That the procedural view does not aim to unify the informal sphere offers 
hope that it can avoid oppression and exclusion.  
By virtue of increasing responsiveness to democratic values, PDIP’s changes 
should remove oppression, not impose it. The means through which I have suggested that 
informal politics can be improved offer further evidence that shaping the informal sphere 
doesn’t necessitate oppressive policies.62 Education, civil associations, social movements, 
                                                                                                                                            
require students to develop and to exercise intellectually disciplined judgment.” Gutmann, 
Democratic Education, 63. 
61 Jensen, Liberal Democracy and Civil Society, provides a good overview of some of these 
approaches. 
62 A democratic communitarian might object that some of the defenses I offer for PDIP can also 
support SDIP. Admittedly, democratic communitarians can and do offer such defenses, pointing 
to the various means I propose for shaping informal politics; they claim SDIP can avoid 
problematic moral consequences. My response to this point is offered in the paper’s earlier 
section where I outline how communitarianism generates concerns about democratic informal 
politics. To reiterate, SDIP can appeal to the same means for shaping informal politics as PDIP, 
but given the strong demands of SDIP, democratic communitarians’ hopes of successfully relying 
on these means (rather than more oppressive ones) is implausible. Moreover, being committed to 
democratic values is not enough for communitarians to avoid oppression or exclusion, given that 
their conceptions of democracy are particularistic and overly unitary. 
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and other systems can all both promote and lessen oppression. These proposals need not 
threaten to be more oppressive just because they advance PDIP. Caution must always be 
exercised and advocates of democracy must spell out how these means can support PDIP, 
particularly with respect to individual cases. The same points can be made about pursuing 
justice in formal politics, however.  
PDIP aims to counter exercises of liberty and rights that undermine democratic 
values, though. For instance, this view discourages representations of social groups as 
unworthy of political inclusion. But that is not to say that the view demands that such 
representations be banned; freedom of speech is still crucial.  
For example, take the use of the word “illegal” to marginalize, exclude, and 
devalue the humanity and labor of nonwhite racial communities in the United States—the 
slur often focuses on undocumented immigrants, but is sometimes applied more widely.63 
Someone who holds the formalist thesis will not see a democratic problem here. Freedom 
of speech must be protected, so such language, while offensive, must be allowed. 
Furthermore, the formalist will reject any normative expectation that society ought to 
develop informal norms of speech supportive of democracy. While the proponent of the 
informalist thesis can agree about formally institutionalizing free speech, they will 
disagree with leaving open whether civil society’s informal norms are democratic or not. 
From the standpoint of democracy, it is open to the informalist to object to the possible 
stigmatization consequent to the use of the word “illegal” (even if they have no desire to 
censor it). The best response to such slurs may be spontaneous, vocal social movements 
from the informal sphere itself. Such movements may persuade citizens of the 
                                                
63 Mendoza, “A ‘Nation’ of Immigrants,” 46–47. 
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problematic nature of stigmatization, convincing them of the harm social disrespect does 
to marginalized groups. Challenging such language may reduce its predominance or 
acceptability in everyday life. Delicate cases where rights conflict with important goods 
are always difficult to approach, though—both for formalist and informalist approaches. 
Encouraging democratic theory to consider such informal political issues presents it with 
new challenges, but need not require it to become heavy handed and morally illegitimate. 
Exclusion is supposed to be expressly avoided by proceduralizing democratic 
informal politics. PDIP need (and perhaps ought) not embody the majority culture qua 
majority culture. There is also no reason to ground its justification in a comprehensive 
doctrine; the values of democracy are all that are necessary. PDIP does not depend on 
deep solidarity centered on a particular communal value orientation, nor does it require 
the state to engender neighborly solidarity. It needn’t be exclusionary, then. 
IV. Conclusion 
The apparent dilemma that democracy faced as a result of needing certain sorts of 
informal politics presents less of a concern than it might have at first seemed. Accepting 
democratic demands on the informal sphere does not initiate an inexorable collision 
course with either practical impossibility or moral impermissibility, so long as we adopt a 
version of PDIP. Yet we should not be overconfident about democratic progress. My aim 
has been modest, although significant. In a Kantian or Rawlsian vein, the question at 
issue in contending with this dilemma is about what we can reasonably hope for. Because 
of the empirical, contingent nature of informal politics, there can be no definitive, general 
answer to worries about whether adequate democratic informal politics will emerge. It 
may never reach a sufficient level in most places, let alone a perfect one. As Wellmer 
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puts it, the seemingly circular dilemma of informal politics “is an unavoidable practical 
[problem] rather than an inherently vicious theoretical one.”64 Through luck and effort, it 
is necessary to align the informal sphere and democratic values, if we truly care about 
democracy. What I have been trying to show is that we do not have philosophical reasons 
to give up on this project, given its role in democratic life.65 
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